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Abstract—Mobile malware has continued to grow at an 
alarming rate despite on-going mitigation efforts. This has 
been much more prevalent on Android due to being an open 
platform that is rapidly overtaking other competing 
platforms in the mobile smart devices market. Recently, a 
new generation of Android malware families has emerged 
with advanced evasion capabilities which make them much 
more difficult to detect using conventional methods. This 
paper proposes and investigates a parallel machine learning 
based classification approach for early detection of Android 
malware. Using real malware samples and benign 
applications, a composite classification model is developed 
from parallel combination of heterogeneous classifiers. The 
empirical evaluation of the model under different 
combination schemes demonstrates its efficacy and potential 
to improve detection accuracy. More importantly, by 
utilizing several classifiers with diverse characteristics, their 
strengths can be harnessed not only for enhanced Android 
malware detection but also quicker white box analysis by 
means of the more interpretable constituent classifiers.  
Keywords-Android; malware detection; machine learning; 
data mining; parallel classifiers; static analysis; mobile 
security.  
I.  INTRODUCTION (HEADING 1) 
Android malware is growing at an astonishing rate 
despite the measures currently in use to curtail infection 
amongst the growing population of Android users 
worldwide. The primary means of Android app 
distribution is via app markets, and several unofficial 
online app stores are emerging alongside the official 
Google Play app store. Since February 2011, Google 
introduced Bouncer to its app store in order to screen 
submitted apps for malicious behavior. Despite this 
measure, there were still some reported outbreaks of 
Android malware distributed via the official market. For 
example, DroidDream was distributed through the official 
Android Market and according to Symantec affected 
50,000 to 200,000 users. In fact, the analysis process of 
Bouncer, which is based on run-time dynamic analysis, has 
been previously demonstrated by Oberheide and Miller to 
be vulnerable to detection avoidance by well-crafted 
malicious apps [1]. The third party Android app stores that 
have emerged in recent years have also become a very 
potent source of malicious app distribution as these stores 
have weak to non-existent measures to prevent malicious 
apps from being uploaded and distributed to users’ 
devices. 
Studies such as [2] have revealed that current families 
of Android malware are difficult to promptly spot in the 
wild. This is because of the evasion techniques being used 
to conceal malicious payload, usually within seemingly 
innocuous apps that provide functionalities that users want. 
By employing polymorphic techniques and encrypting 
malicious payload, signature-based scanning is easily 
bypassed. With increased code obfuscation, malware 
analysts take longer to uncover the malicious behavior, 
classify samples, and generate signatures for detecting the 
new threats. Moreover, some Android malware families 
like AnserverBot are known to have the capability to fetch 
and execute malicious payloads at run time thus rendering 
the zero-day detection of such malware by prior signatures 
quite ineffective. 
These challenges call for new and more effective 
detection approaches to mitigate the impact of evolving 
Android malware. Hence, in this paper we propose a 
method for early detection of Android malware by means 
of parallel machine learning classifiers that utilize diverse 
algorithms with inherently different characteristics. A 
number of static app features are used in the learning phase 
of the model development. The trained models are 
combined using various combination schemes to yield a 
composite model that produces a verdict of ‘suspicious’ or 
‘benign’ in order to classify a given new application. 
Utilizing diverse machine learning classifiers in 
parallel for Android malware detection, has potential 
benefits beyond accuracy improvement. It is possible to 
harness the various strengths of the constituent classifiers 
in other ways such as complementing white box analysis 
through close observation of intermediate output from the 
more interpretable base models. 
The main contributions of this paper are the following: 
• A new Android malware detection approach is 
developed using parallel machine learning 
classifiers. To the best of our knowledge this is the 
first paper to investigate such an approach for 
proactive Android malware detection. 
• Extensive empirical evaluation of the approach by 
means of real malware samples and benign 
applications, demonstrating its real-world 
applicability and capacity for improved detection 
accuracy.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
briefly describes Android application structure and how it 
provides the app features that underpin our machine 
learning based malware detection approach. Section III 
presents the machine learning classification algorithms 
used to develop the composite classification schemes. 
Section IV describes the methodology employed to 
investigate and evaluate the performance of the proposed 
malware detection approach. Section V presents the 
evaluation results and discussions. Section VI discusses 
related works. Finally, section VII draws conclusions and 
highlights our future work. 
II. ANDROID APPLICATION STRUCTURE AND FEATURE 
EXTRACTION  
A. Android Application Basics 
An Android application (app) is built from four 
different types of components: Activities, Services, 
Broadcast Receivers, and Content Providers. Activities are 
the components that provide GUI functionality to enable 
user interactivity, whilst Services and Broadcast Receivers 
operate in the background when an app is running. Content 
providers encapsulate data to provide to an app via an 
interface. Many Android apps consist of at least a number 
of Activities that are invoked via intents, whilst the other 
three building blocks may optionally be present depending 
on the app’s functionality. 
Android apps are written in Java and compiled into a 
single archive file (Android package or APK), along with 
data and resource files. Android-powered devices use this 
APK to install the application. An APK consists of several 
components including: (1) an XML manifest file 
containing information such as app description, 
components declaration (i.e. Activities, Services, 
Broadcast Receivers etc.), and permissions. (2) A 
Classes.dex file that is a Dalvik executable file that runs in 
its own instance of a Dalvik Virtual Machine. (3) A /res 
directory for indexed resources like icons, images, music 
etc. (4) A /lib directory for compiled code. (5) /META-INF 
folder holding the app certificate and list of resources, 
SHA-1 digest etc. (6) Resources.arsc which is a compiled 
resource file. 
A.  App Feature Extraction for Machine Learning 
The malware detection approach investigated in this 
paper utilizes the static features of an Android app 
extracted from the APK file in order to determine whether 
it contains malicious payload or not. It therefore relies on a 
trained composite classification model (described later) to 
arrive at the decision. The features employed in training 
the machine learning model are extracted from a corpus of 
malware samples and benign apps using a bespoke APK 
analysis tool written in Java. Details of the APK analysis 
tool can be found in our previous work [3]. 
  Three categories of features are used for the learning 
phase: 1) API related features 2) App permissions 3) 
Standard OS and Android framework commands. The API 
related features are obtained by mining the Classes.dex file 
using the steps described in [3]. They consists of keywords 
which enable detection of the use of selected standard 
Android API calls (through which the app interacts with 
various device functionalities) as well as selected Java API 
calls used to enrich apps’ functionality.  
The permission features are keywords that map onto 
the standard Android permissions which are declared in 
the manifest file, therefore enabling the extraction of the 
permissions being requested by the app for its 
functionalities. For example SEND_SMS keyword allows 
for the detection of the permission request for the app to be 
able to send SMS messages, if declared in the manifest 
file. The commands related features are keywords that 
detect the presence of Linux commands such as ‘chown’, 
‘mount’ etc. or certain parameters which might be used 
with these commands. These commands are usually 
embedded in hidden files within the APK and invoked by 
rogue apps to enable unusual activities like privilege 
escalation, launching hidden scripts or embedded 
malicious binary files, or concealment of malicious 
activities. Table I presents an overview of the features 
under their various categories. 
TABLE I.  OVERVIEW OF FEATURES EXTRACTED FROM THE APPS 
AND THEIR BROAD CATEGORIES 
Type Features (keywords) 
API calls 
related 
abortBroadcast; getDeviceId; getSubscriberId; 
getCallState;getSimSerialNumber; getLineNumber; 
getSimCountryIso; getNetworkOperator; 
getSimOperator; getPackageManager; 
Runtime.exec(); android.provider.Contacts; 
android.provider.ContactsContract; HttpPost_init; 
HttpGet_init; HttpUriRequest; SMSReceiver; 
bindService; onActivityResult; SecretKey;KeySpec; 
FindClass; createSubprocess; Ljavax_crypto_Cipher; 
Ljavax_crypto_spec_Secret; DexClassLoader; 
sendMultipartTextMessage; 
Ljava_net_URLDecoder; native; System.loadLibrary; 
reflectgetClass; getMethod; registerReceiver; 
intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED; 
intent.action.RUN 
Command s 
related 
mount; remount; chmod; chown; /res; /system/bin; 
/system/bin/sh; /system/app; .jar; .apk; 
pmsetInstallLocation; pminstall; 
GET_META_DATA; GET_RECEIVERS; 
GET_SERVICES; GET_SIGNATURES; 
GET_PERMISSIONS 
Permissions ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION; 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION; WRITE_SMS; 
SEND_SMS;  WRITE_CALL_LOG; 
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS; BROADCAST_SMS; 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED; 
RECEIVE_MMS; RECEIVE_SMS; 
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH; RECORD_AUDIO; 
CALL_PHONE; WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE; 
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE; CLEAR_APP_CACHE; 
INSTALL_PACKAGES; INTERNET; 
CAMERA;CHANGE_CONFIGURATION; 
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE 1              
1 A total of 125 permissions are used. 
III. MACHINE LEARNING MODELS FOR THE PARALLEL 
CLASSIFICATION APPROACH  
Machine learning (ML) classifiers have played a part in 
the development of intelligent systems for several domains 
over the years. ML approaches are gaining traction in 
identification and detection of malware on both mobile and 
PC platforms. Our work is based on supervised machine 
learning whereby the features described in the previous 
section are acquired from a labelled dataset and used to 
build and train a model. The ML algorithms considered in 
our investigation include: Decision Tree (tree-based), 
Simple Logistic (function-based), Naïve Bayes 
(probabilistic), PART (rule-based), and RIDOR (rule-
based). 
  Our proposed approach in this paper for a machine 
learning based zero-day Android malware detection is a 
composite model of the aforementioned heterogeneous 
classifiers utilized in various parallel combination 
schemes. The approach is intended to leverage the 
strengths of different kinds of supervised learning 
algorithms to produce a single classification verdict for 
new applications. Hence, the composite model is built 
from a function-based, tree-based, probabilistic, and two 
rule based algorithms. Figure 1 illustrates the building 
blocks of the detection approach. The rule based classifiers 
produce the most easily interpretable output whilst the 
probabilistic classifier is most easily amenable to post-
training sensitivity tuning. 
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Fig. 1.  Android malware detection with the composite parallel classifier 
approach. 
The constituent ML algorithms of the parallel detector 
include: 
Decision Tree (DT):  Decision trees are generally 
known as ‘divide and conquer’ algorithms. Decision trees 
are sequential models which logically combine a sequence 
of simple tests where a numerical attribute (feature) is 
compared against a threshold value or a nominal attribute 
(feature) against a set of possible values [4]. It is 
essentially a flow chart like structure where each internal 
node denotes a test on an attribute with each branch 
representing an outcome of the test and each leaf holding a 
class label. 
Simple Logistic (SL): is an ensemble learning algorithm 
which utilizes additive logistic regression using simple 
regression functions as base learners [5]. Similar to linear 
regression, it tries to find a function that will fit the 
training data well by computing the weights that 
maximizes the log-likelihood of the logistic regression 
function. SL classifier takes relatively longer to train but is 
fast in classification. 
Naïve Bayes (NB): The Naïve Bayes classifier operates 
on the (naïve) assumption of independence of all the 
features. Despite this simplifying assumption, NB learners 
and classifiers perform quite well in many real-life 
applications, most famously in document classification and 
spam filtering. Compared to more sophisticated methods, 
NB learning and classification can be extremely fast. 
PART: is a ‘separate-and-conquer’ rule learner which 
produces ordered sets of rules called ‘decision lists’ [6]. 
Features from a new app will be compared to each rule in 
the list in turn, and the app is assigned the category of the 
first matching rule (a default is applied if no rule 
successfully matches). PART builds a partial C4.5 decision 
tree in each iteration and then turns the “best” leaf into a 
rule.  
RIDOR: Ridor (Ripple Down Rule learner) [7] is a rule 
learning algorithm that generates a default rule and then 
exceptions to the default rule with the least weighted error 
rate. It generates the best exception for each exception and 
iterates until pure, thus performing a tree-like expansion of 
exceptions. The exceptions are the rules that predict 
classes other than the default. Ridor also falls under the 
general class of ‘separate and conquer’ ML algorithms. 
IV. INVESTIGATION  METHODOLOGY  
A.  Input Preprocessing 
By means of our bespoke APK analysis tool described 
in [2], the features depicted in Table 1, were extracted and 
preprocessed into a matrix of input vectors for training the 
machine learning algorithms. Each column of the matrix 
represented a single feature, while the rows represented the 
feature vectors from a single app from the training corpus. 
The feature vectors were made up of (one of possible 
values of) 1’s and 0’s depicting the presence or absence of 
the corresponding column feature respectively, as detected 
by the APK analysis tool.  A total of 179 training features 
were extracted, with the breakdown as follows: API calls 
and commands related: 54 features. App permissions: 125.  
B.  Model Training 
Since supervised learning is the underlying method 
being used, the training set consisted of app samples 
labelled in one of two classes; suspicious or benign. A total 
of 6,863 applications (from McAfee internal repository) 
were utilized; 2925 malicious apps and 3,938 non-
malicious apps. Thus, the input training matrix is of size 
6,836 by 180 (179 features and 1 column with the class 
label). 
C.  Model Evaluation 
In order to evaluate the performance of the classifier 
model, the 10-fold cross validation technique is applied to 
the matrix. Thus, the dataset is partitioned into 10 equal 
parts, k1, k2, k3 to k10 without overlaps. Each step in the 
evaluation takes one partition as test data and applies a 
trained model from the other 9 parts. The results are 
averaged to provide a final performance results for the 
classifier. k-fold cross validation technique is a very 
popular ML evaluation method and is appropriate to our 
goal of determining the relative effectiveness of the ML 
classifiers in detecting unknown malicious apps which is 
emulated by the non-overlapping testing partitions. 
The following performance metrics are used to 
investigate the parallel classifier approach to Android 
malware detection. 
• True positive ratio (TPR): This is the ratio of 
correctly classified malicious apps to the total 
number of malicious apps in the dataset. 
• True negative ratio (TNR): The ratio of correctly 
classified benign apps to the total number of 
benign apps in the dataset. 
• False positive ratio (FPR): The ratio of incorrectly 
classified benign apps to the total number of 
benign apps in the dataset. 
• False negative ratio (FNR): The ratio of 
incorrectly classified malicious apps to the total 
number of malicious apps in the dataset. 
• Accuracy (ACC):  This is the total accuracy of the 
classifier given by (TPR + TNR)/ (TPR + TNR + 
FPR + FNR). 
• Error ratio (ERR):  This is computed from: 1-
ACC. 
• AUC (Area under ROC): ROC is the receiver 
operation characteristics curve. AUC is an 
estimate of the area under ROC which indicates 
the predictive power of the classifier. Classifiers 
with higher AUC have better predictive power and 
can provide for better sensitivity tuning. 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
A.  Experiment 1: Individual Classifiers Experiments  
In order to obtain baseline results for investigating the 
parallel classifiers approach to Android malware detection, 
the first set of experiments were performed with each of 
the individual candidate classification algorithms for the 
composite model. These include the Naïve Bayes, PART, 
RIDOR, Decision Tree and Simple Logistic discussed in 
Section III. 
The results from each of these classifiers are 
summarized together in Table II. The preprocessed input 
training matrix and the training-testing methodology 
described in Section IV were applied in turn to each 
classifier to obtain the results presented in Table II. 
TABLE II.   PERFORMANCE RESULTS FROM THE 5 INDIVIDUAL 
CLASSIFIERS. 
 
Algorithm 
Performance metrics 
TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR AUC 
NB 0.821 0.913 0.087 0.179 0.867 0.133 0.915
SL 0.909 0.954 0.046 0.091 0.932 0.068 0.977
DT 0.948 0.960 0.040 0.052 0.954 0.046 0.964
RIDOR 0.957 0.942 0.058 0.043 0.950 0.050 0.949
PART 0.958 0.967 0.033 0.042 0.963 0.037 0.970
 
The NB classifier can be seen to have the least 
detection ratio (TPR) of all the five classifiers, and also the 
least overall accuracy. The SL classifier has the next best 
malware detection capability with about 91% detection 
ratio whilst DT, RIDOR and PART showed better 
detection with 94.8%, 95.7% and 95.8% respectively. In 
terms of the overall accuracy/error rates, PART proved to 
be the best performer.  
B.  Implications for Parallel Classification 
Recall that PART derives its decision rules from partial 
decision trees by selecting the ‘best’ leaf from a branch in 
each iteration. The number of decision rules derived for the 
PART model built from the full 6863 by 180 matrix 
training dataset was 74 rules. Hence, from our proposed 
179 features, a compact rule set is built with PART which 
is small enough to be used in a parallel classification 
scenario without incurring excessive classification 
overhead for new applications. With the RIDOR 
algorithm, an even smaller rule set of 25 rules was derived. 
As for the Decision Tree (J48 algorithm), 143 leaves 
resulted from model building. This means we have a 
relatively small decision tree with at most 143 decision 
branches. The SL model takes the longest to train since 
weights have to be determined for each feature in order to 
fit a logistic regression model to the data. On the other 
hand, classification of new applications is fast since an 
already trained model requires only linear additive and 
multiplicative steps in the decision stage. The NB model is 
fast to train because it involves calculation of probabilities 
from the frequencies derived from the input matrix. It is 
also fast in classification because, like the SL, a decision 
involves only linear multiplicative and additive 
computations. Hence, NB and SL are deemed along with 
the other 3 obtained models, suitable for a combined 
parallel classification scheme, due to the overall low 
computational overhead involved in classifying new 
applications in order to detect the presence of malicious 
payload. 
C. Experiment 2: Parallel Classifiers Experiments 
In the second set of experiments, the combined 
classification approach which involved a parallel 
combination of classification decisions obtained from each 
individual classifier was investigated. Four different 
combination schemes were considered: 
Average of probabilities: i.e. an average of the 
probabilities of each class (suspicious/benign) from the 
individual classifiers. Thus, a new application is 
considered suspicious if: Avg. (P1sus + P2sus + P3sus + P4sus 
+ P5sus) > Avg. (P1ben + P2ben + P3ben + P4ben + P5ben). 
Otherwise, it is classed as benign. 
Product of probabilities: i.e. product of the probabilities 
of each class (suspicious/benign) from the individual 
classifiers. Thus, a new application is considered 
suspicious if:  (P1sus · P2sus · P3sus · P4sus · P5sus) > (P1ben · 
P2ben · P3ben · P4ben· P5ben). Otherwise, it is classed as 
benign. 
Maximum probability: i.e. The maximum probabilities 
for each class (suspicious/benign) of the probabilities 
output from individual classifier are compared. Thus, a 
new application is considered suspicious if:  Max (P1sus, 
P2sus, P3sus, P4sus, P5sus) > Max (P1ben, P2ben, P3ben, P4ben, 
P5ben). Otherwise, it is classed as benign. 
Majority vote: For majority vote, individual class 
decisions are made by each classifier. The majority verdict 
is taking as the final output decision class. 
The results for the various combination schemes used 
in the parallel classification approach are shown in Table 
III. The detection rate (TPR) of the parallel classifier 
approach either equaled or performed better than any of 
the single classifier baseline TPRs obtained in the first set 
of experiments. With the maximum probability scheme, the 
best detection rate performance of 97.5% is obtained. This 
is a detection accuracy improvement over the 95.7% that 
obtains from the best individual classifier performance in 
the first set of experiments. The improvement equates to 
about 50 more malware samples detected in the former 
scheme than the latter. The detection rate improvement 
comes at the price of a slight increase in the FPR over that 
of the best performing individual classifier. However, the 
products of probabilities scheme improves the detection 
rate to 97.3% without incurring an increase in FPR when 
compared to the performance of the individual classifiers 
in Table II. 
TABLE III.   PERFORMANCE RESULTS FROM FOUR PARALLEL 
COMBINATION SCHEMES UTILIZING THE 5 CLASSIFIERS 
 
Combination 
Performance metrics 
TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR AUC 
AvgProb 0.957 0.969 0.031 0.043 0.963 0.037 0.988
ProdProb 0.973 0.970 0.030 0.027 0.972 0.028 0.953
MaxProb 0.975 0.928 0.072 0.025 0.952 0.048 0.986
MVote 0.957 0.969 0.031 0.043 0.963 0.037 0.963
 
From Table III, it can be seen that the best accuracy 
and TNR results come from the products of probabilities 
combination schemes. All the identification, error/accuracy 
results from the products of probabilities parallel 
classifiers scheme are better than the baseline performance 
results from the individual classifiers in the previous set of 
experiments. The results in Table III demonstrate the 
efficacy of applying parallel classifiers to detection of 
Android malware using the features and approach 
described in this paper. Considering the relatively low 
classification overhead that the selected diverse base 
classifiers present, we consider the proposed classification 
approach a practically viable means of improving Android 
malware detection to complement existing solutions. 
Especially, for detecting zero-day Android malware for 
which no signatures have been derived. 
VI. RELATED WORK 
The two main approaches applicable to malware 
analysis are dynamic analysis and static analysis. Most 
existing research aimed at non-signature based detection of 
Android malware generally utilizes either a dynamic or 
static analysis approach. A few exceptions like the AAS 
sandbox presented in [8] combine both approaches. 
Android malware detection approaches based on dynamic 
analysis can be found in Crowdroid proposed by Burguera 
et al. in [9]. Crowdroid is a behavior based malware 
detection system for Android that uses run-time system 
call features and clustering algorithms to detect Android 
malware. MADAM [10] is also a dynamic analysis based 
anomaly detector for Android malware. MADAM 
monitors Android at the kernel-level and user-level and 
applies machine learning classifiers.  MADAM was tested 
on 10 monitored real malware and according to the 
authors, showed a negligible impact on the user 
experience.  
In [11], Shabtai et al. proposed Andromaly, a host-
based Android malware detection solution that employs 
dynamic analysis. Andromaly continuously monitors 
various features and events like CPU consumption, 
number of packets sent, number of running processes, 
keyboard/touch-screen pressing etc. Machine learning 
anomaly detectors are then applied to classify the collected 
data into normal or abnormal. In [12], AntiMalDroid was 
proposed by Zhao et al. AntiMalDroid is a dynamic 
analysis behavior based malware detection framework that 
uses logged behavior sequence as features for SVM model 
training and detection. 
Different from these previous works that are based on 
dynamic analysis, the approach in this paper employs a 
static analysis based approach for malware detection. In 
this case, static code properties are used to proactively 
identify malware before it is installed and run on a device. 
Hence our method can be applied to screening a large 
number of apps on an app market in a relatively short time 
period.  Furthermore, the resource constraints imposed by 
the handheld devices are avoided by our approach. 
Another important advantage of a static based approach 
over a dynamic one is that it is undetectable by the 
malware itself i.e. malware cannot modify its behavior 
during analysis [2].  Static analysis offers faster, less 
resource intensive and more code coverage in less time 
than dynamic runtime analysis.  
Previous Android malware analysis works which 
employ static analysis include DroidMat [13]. DroidMat 
uses k-means clustering to detect malware based on static 
functional behaviors derived from API and permissions 
detected in the application. In [14], a static analysis based 
Bayesian classification method was developed to 
categorize apps into ‘benign’ or ‘suspicious’ using 58 
static code-based features. The training and classification 
employed 1000 Android malware samples from 49 
families and 1000 benign applications. The approach in 
[15] utilized permissions and call flow graphs for training 
SVM models to distinguish between benign and malicious 
Android apps. The authors derived one-class SVM models 
based on the benign samples alone and use these for 
identification of both benign and malicious apps. In [16], 
the authors also apply machine learning with static 
analysis, but utilize Linux malware rather than Android 
malware samples. Their approach extracts Linux system 
commands within Android and use the readelf command to 
output a list of referenced function calls for each system 
command. The same method is used to extract a static list 
of function calls with 240 Linux virus, worms, and 
Trojans. Both sets are applied to train PART, Prism and 
Nearest Neighbor algorithms for classification.  
In [17], Sanz et al compared various machine learning 
schemes trained with permission features on their malware 
detection accuracy. Their analysis was based on 249 
malware samples and 347 benign apps. Sarma et al. [18] 
and Peng et al. [19] also apply permissions to train SVM 
based and Bayesian based models respectively for risk 
ranking of Android apps. The study in this paper also 
utilizes permissions as features but differs from the 
previous by including a more extensive feature set not used 
in the previous works. For example, command related 
features are not used in previous works (except in [14]). 
From our experience, these features have been found to be 
quite effective in enhancing the classification accuracy of 
trained machine learning models that are based on static 
analysis. Moreover, this paper proposes and evaluates a 
more effective way of leveraging static code features for 
Android malware through parallel machine learning 
classification schemes. The research in [2] and [20] are 
some of the previous work that are not based on machine 
learning approaches but do apply static analysis for 
Android malware detection. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
In this paper a parallel classification approach to 
Android malware detection using inherently diverse 
machine learning algorithms was investigated. The 
proposed approach utilized a wide range of features which 
included API calls-related, commands-related and 
permission features. The recent increase in Android 
malware and their growing ability for adept detection 
avoidance of existing signature-based approaches 
definitely calls for novel alternatives. The parallel 
classification approach proposed in this paper is a viable 
scheme that provides a complementary tool that not only 
potentially improves Android malware detection but also 
allows the strengths of diverse classifiers to be leveraged. 
For example, the rule based classifiers can provide human-
interpretable intermediate output that can be useful for 
driving further analysis stages. Furthermore, the proposed 
approach is ideal from performance point of view since it 
is cost effective in classifying a new application because: 
1) static app features are employed and 2) the selected 
constituent classification models have low computational 
requirements during classification decision.  
As future work, we aim to develop and evaluate an 
Android malware detection engine using the investigated 
approach. Further study involving the performance tuning 
of the detection engine when applied to new datasets from 
emerging Android app markets will also be considered.  
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